German POWs

There was kind of a throw away comment made in class that German POWs that the Soviets held were not released "well into the 50's".
How could this have been allowed? It seems like if we were trying to perhaps rectify past mistakes, like the reparations that Germany had to pay and such from the first World War, why would any of the allies allow the Soviets to hold these prisoners for such a long time after victory in Europe? Is this a common practice that I'm not aware of?

Presentation 3/5/08

There was a bulge around the town of Kursk that was about 100 miles long in 1943. The two forces on either side of Kursk focused everything on the bulge. The Germans were delayed for supplies. Russians were aware that the attack would happen, and so had time to prepare and place land mines, barbed wire, and 1.3 million men there, many of whom were vets of Stalingrad. The aftermath of this was that Stalin started to trust intelligence more and starts micromanaging his officers less.

Presentations:

 It is impossible for me to fathom the extent of the losses suffered at any battle.  However, the numbers lost during the Battle of Kursk are beyond what I can envision.  Along with this same thought, I cannot imagine the extensive numbers of military armors, such as the 2400 Soviet tanks, that put to use in this battle.  I also thought it was interesting as to the attacks and counterattacks performed.  The Germans delayed the attack allowing the Russians time to regroup and prepare their strategies.  It was apparent from the presentation that the Russian army had developed better plans in being able to turn from defensive to offensive and drive the Russians back.

 

I, personally, had never heard of the Rzhev Pocket before the presentation.  It was interesting to note that Rzhev was seen as a “dagger aimed at Moscow.”  It seems strange that if this was the site of a major battle during the war, more detailed information would have been written about it.  However, as pointed out during the presentation, it was amazing how quickly the Russian Army was pulled together and the strength that it provided when mobilized into action.  

OPERATION BLAU:

The ugliness and brutality of war favors no side better than the other.  In reading about Operation Blau, it talked about Hitler’s relentless control of his commanders.  He felt that his judgment was far superior to his commanders, who he controlled on all issues.  It was nothing for him to strip a commander of his rank and throw him in prison if he felt that he was weakening in command.  While we know that Hitler was this way, it is interesting to note that other leaders also acted in the same way.  An example of this was when Stalin issued Order 227, which called for the immediate execution of anyone in the troops who failed in the line of duty.  Another interesting point about Operation Blau was that for everything Hitler threw at the Russians, they were able to throw back.  He had highly intelligent and professional military commanders, but he failed to allow them the freedom to command their troops.  He was commander-in-chief.  No one else, just him.  

1942

I found it very interesting that several of the successful leaders in these readings like many others we have learned about were not necessarily groomed to be strong leaders, but thier personalities guided them into these positions. General Bernard Law Montgomery was a relatively unknown British comander who used his understanding of soldiers and high energy to force success for his side. America's Eisenhower used his hard work and unique personality to work his way up and into success. Germany's Manstein had been protege, but it was his brilliance and ambition that helped him succeed and acheive promotions. These are just a few examples of interesting people I saw in the reading. What was interesting about them was that they had not been very successful before their acheivements in North Africa or in the East. These individuals may not have gotten the positions they were after, there was not a definate sign that they were headed for greatness, and very successful leaders did not take them under their wing to learn how to be great. I wonder what it was that made these leaders successful or great or victorious.

Was it just luck? Could it have been thier personalities and determination despite their very different attitudes? Or is there more than the reading lets us know? And was there a path and signs that these men and others like them would be great? Maybe they had advantages that other leaders did not have? War is strange, it could have made these men rise to the occasion or circumstances!

Who gets to fight?

This may have fit better with the discussion on the AGCT but was the U.S. draft process more or less filtered than the other countries involved? It seems like Japan, German, and Russia just had non-stop waves of bodies to throw into this war. It would seem that sending less, but better trained troops would cut down on deaths and lead to a more strategic war. I could be totally off base here, but it seems that if the U.S. had just sent every capable man who could fire a gun into war we would not have preformed as well due to even more inexperienced soldiers messing things up. Would a more detailed selection process have helped these other countries?

Presentations

The Rzhev Pocket and Kursk presentation showed me the huge scale that the battles on the Eastern Front were fought. In the Rzhev Pocket alone the Russian lost 300K plus men and do not forget about the material. The battle of Kursk was fought with about a fifth of the Russian Army at the time. I just find it amazing that the Germans could hold off these types of numbers. I think it all shows that if it was not for Russia’s huge resources they would have lost the war because it seems their main tactic was to overwhelm the enemy with pure numbers.